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ENFORCEABILITY UNDER THE UNITED STATES
ARBITRATION ACT: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS AND CONTRACTS NOT
"INVOLVING COMMERCE"I*
THE Federal Arbitration Act makes certain arbitration agreements bind-
ing on the contracting parties.' Section 2 of the Act provides that written
agreements to arbitrate which are incorporated in, or which relate to, "mari-
time transactions" or "contracts evidencing transactions involving [interstate
or foreign] commerce" shall be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." 2 Sec-
tion I excludes "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers [in such commerce]."3 The remaining sections
of the Act establish procedures for enforcement of arbitration agreements
and for confirmation and vacation of awards. 4 These procedural sections
refer to suits in federal courts, but do not specifically limit the operation of
the procedures to controversies involving commerce.5 Decisions interpreting
the Arbitration Act conflict on two important issues: the statute's applicability
to collective bargaining agreements 0 and the availability of the enforcement
*Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical P. & M. Wkrs., 207 F.2d 450 (3d
Cir. 1953).
1. The United States Arbitration Act was originally enacted as 43 SmTr. 883 (1925),
9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1946). It was re-adopted, 9 U.S.C. § 1 ct seq. (Supp. 1952) when
Title 9 of the United States Code was enacted into positive law. See, generally, ABA,
Comm. on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, The United States Arbitratior Law
and its Application, 11 A.B.A.J. 153 (1925) ; Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbi-
tration Law, 12 VA. L Rav. 265 (1926); Sturges & Murphy, ,Sonc Confusing Matters
Relating to Arbitration under the U.S. Arbitration Act, 17 LAW & CONTEzaP. Pnou. 320
(1952).
2. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 1952).
3. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1952).
4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-14 (Supp. 1952). Section 3, stay of proceedings where issue refer-
able to arbitration; section 4, court order to compel arbitration; section 5, appointment
of arbitrators; section 6, application to the court heard as a motion; section 7, process
for obtaining witnesses; section 8, proceedings in admiralty begun by libel and seizure
of vessel; section 9, confirmation of arbitrators' awards; section 10, vacation of awards;
section 11, modification or correction of awards; section 12, notice of motions to vacate
or modify; section 13, filing of papers, force and effect of award; section 14, contracts
made prior to January 1, 1926 not affected.
5. See note 4 supra.
6. Compare Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943)
(applicable to collective bargaining agreements) ; United Office & Pro. WVkrs. v. Monu-
mental Life Ins. Co., 88 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (same), with Gatliff Coal Co. v.
Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944) (inapplicable to collective bargaining agreements);
Int'l Union v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 163 F2d 33 (4th Cir. 1943) (same,
alternative holding).
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sections to litigants in federal court who seek to enforce commercial arbitra-
tion contracts involving only intrastate commerce. 7
In Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical R. & M. Workers,8 the
Third Circuit attempted to resolve both of these problems. Employer stied
union in federal district court for alleged breach of their collective bargain-
ing agreement. 9 Invoking Section 3 of the Arbitration Act,10 defendant moved
for a stay of suit pending arbitration called for by provisions of the contract.
Stay was denied, and defendant appealed. Sitting en banc, the Third Circuit
reversed. Four judges, following the Greyhound cases," decided that the
employment contract exception of Section 1 embraced collective bargaining
agreements.' 2 By itself the effect of this holding would have been to maintain
the narrow interpretation of the Act's coverage previously adopted.lu But
by applying the ejusdern generis rule to the phrase, "seamen, railroad em-
ployees, or any other class of workers engaged in ... commerce," the court
determined that Section 1 excluded only the contracts of transportation
workers.' 4 The total effect of their decisions on these two points was thus to
weaken the thrust of the exclusion and expand the scope of the Act. Since
the members of the defendant union were not transportation workers, the
court held that the Section 1 exception was no bar to enforcement of the
parties' arbitration clause."5 Two judges concurred in that conclusion on the
ground that collective bargaining agreements were not "employment con-
tracts."' 6 The two dissenters, on the other hand, thought that the defendant's
7. Compare In re Cold Metal Process Co., 9 F. Supp. 992 (W.D. Pa. 1935) (both
§§ 3 & 4 inapplicable to contracts not involving commerce) ; Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg.
Co., 44 F.2d 184 (D. Del. 1930) (same), with Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United
States, 142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944) (§ 3 held applicable to commercial arbitration con-
tract not involving interstate commerce). But see Sturges & Murphy, Arbitration under
the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAW & CONEM=P. PaoD. 580, 596-604 (1952).
8. 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953).
9. Plaintiff sued under the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAr. 156 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 185 (Supp. 1952) (§ 301a).
10. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (Supp. 1952).
11. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Ass'n, 193 F.2d 327 (3d Cir.
1952); Amalgamated Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir.
1951).
12. Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical R. & M. Wkrs., 207 F.2d 450, 451-2
(3d Cir. 1953).
13. See cases cited note 11 supra. See also Int'l Union v. Colonial Hardwood Floor-
ing Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948) ; Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir.
1944).
14. Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical R. & M. Wkrs., 207 F.2d 450, 452
(3d Cir. 1953).
15. Id. at 453.
16. Judge Maris, who delivered the opinion of the court, apparently held that col-
lective bargaining agreements were employment contracts only out of deference to his
brethren and against his own better judgment. According to Chief Judge Biggs's con-
curring opinion, Judge Mars thought a proper interpretation of section 1 would construe
a collective bargaining agreement not to be a contract of employment. See Tenney Engi-
neering, Inc. v. United Electrical R. & M. Wkrs., 207 F.2d 450, 455 (3d Cir. 1953).
[Vol. 63
NOTES
arbitration provision could not be enforced, because Section 1 excluded all
collective bargaining agreements from the Act.17
Once the first issue was decided, both the majority and concurring judges
held that a contract does not have to involve foreign or interstate commerce
to be enforceable by means of a stay of suit issued under Section 3 of the
Act. Accordingly, they found it unnecessary to decide whether the Tenney
employment contract involved such commerce.18 Under this interpretation, a
federal court can stay proceedings in a suit before it in order to give effect to
any arbitration contract not expressly put beyond the Act's reach by the em-
ployment contract exception of Section 1. Because the dissent had already
concluded that collective bargaining agreements were specifically excluded
from the Act, it did not discuss this second issue.'0
The court's interpretation of "contracts of employment" to include col-
lective bargaining agreements is the only tenable view. This broader mean-
ing of the statutory phrase is its obvious and natural one.20 And to deny
this construction would be to disregard the origin of the exception. Since it
was inserted into the Act in deference to the demands of organized labor,21
it should be presumed to refer to the natural subject of labor's attention, the
collective contract. Moreover, the alternative interpretation is unacceptable.
The exception was added in committee,22 presumably to effect some change
in the statute's coverage. It expressly mentions the contracts of "seamen
[and] railroad employees." But if the statutory exception merely prevented
enforcement of arbitration clauses in individual contracts of such workers,
its inclusion was apparently useless. Hiring contracts of individual seamen
or railroad employees-indeed, of employees in any mass industry-do not
contain arbitration clauses. Arbitration is a time- and trouble-saving corn-
17. Id. at 455-9.
18. Id. at 454.
19. See id. at 455-9.
20. Amalgamated Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir.
1951) and cases cited therein; Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944).
See Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries, Co., 160 F.2d 661, 662 (3d Cir. 1947). See also
Horton, Ripley & Schnapper, DcniONvARY OF MODER, ECOxONUCS 57 (1943). Contra:
Lewittes & Sons v. United Furniture Workers, 95 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ; United
Office & Pro. Wkrs. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 88 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
21. Hearings before Subcoinmittee of Committee on the Judiciary on S.4214, 67th
Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923). The witness whose testimony against the bill prompted the
amendment excluding contracts of employment was Andrew Furuseth, President of the
International Seamen's Union. Mr. Furuseth's opposition to federal enforcement of labor
arbitration agreement was of long standing. See Hearings before Subcommittee of te
Committee on Labor on H.R. 9491, 58th Cong., 1st Sess. (1904) passim.
See also Gordon, International Aspects of Trade Arbitration, 11 A.B.A.J. 717, 718
(1925): "The proviso in [the Act] which excepts from its operation workers' agree-
ments, while regarded by its framers as no improvement, was suggested by Herbert
Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, a stanch friend of the measure, as a vise sop to the
Cerberus of Labor."
22. Hearings on S. 4214, supra note 21.
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promise resorted to by parties of roughly comparable bargaining power.23
Only employee organization would force a large employer to forego custom-
ary prerogatives by submitting disputes to arbitration. 2' Hence, arbitration
provisions normally will be found only in collective contracts. Ascribing to
Congress the intent to exclude only individual contracts of hire would there-
fore have been unreasonable.
While properly classifying collective bargaining agreements as "contracts
of employment," Tenney arbitrarily limits the scope of the employment con-
tract exception to transportation workers.25 Under the Tenney rationale,
arbitration agreements concerning workers employed in non-transportation
industries involving "commerce" can be enforced. By applying the rule of
ejusd em generis to the text of the exception the court inferred a Congres-
sional intent to effect this differential treatment.2 6 But ejusdem gencris is
merely a rule of statutory construction. It cannot control where the intent
it ascribes to Congress is disproved both by the incongruity which its appli-
cation would produce and also by available legislative history.21
The legislative history of the Arbitration Act indicates that Congress in-
tended to exclude all employment contracts from its operation. A repre-
sentative of the drafters of the statute stated: "It is not intended that this
shall be an act referring to labor disputes, at all."' 28 To clarify this intent
he suggested an amendment which excluded "seamen or any class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" but made no mention of railroad
employees.29 The form of the amendment was clearly dictated by a desire
to parallel Section 2, which declares that the provisions of the Act apply to
"maritime transactions" and "contracts . . . involving commerce. '" ' Cast in
such language, the amendment ensured that Section 1 would exclude all
employment contracts which Section 2 would otherwise have brought within
23. See Feinsinger, Book Review, 5 STAN. L. Rav. 863, 864 (1.953): "(T]he function
of arbitration [is] as a substitute for the strike or lock-out, and the agreement to arbi-
trate [is] the quid pro quo for the no-strike, no-lockout clause."
24. See Hearings before Subcommittee of the Comnittee on Labor on H.R. 9491,
58th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1904) passis.
25. This is the first case so to hold, although this view may have been intimated
in United Office & Pro. Wkrs. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 88 F. Supp. 602, 606 n.4
(E.D. Pa. 1950) and Amalgamated Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 192 F.2d
310, 313-4 (3d Cir. 1951). Even with this foreshadowing, however, at least one district
court understood the Greyhound cases to exclude all collective bargaining contracts.
Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 108 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. Del. 1952).
26. Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical R. & M. Wkrs., 207 F.2d 450,
452-3 (3d Cir. 1953).
27. United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680 (1950); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); Mid-Northern*Co. v. Montana, 268 U.S. 45 (1925).
28. Testimony of W. H. H. Piatt, Chairman, ABA, Comm. on Commerce, Trade
and Commercial Law in Hearings before Subcommittee of the Comnittce on Judiciary
on S. 4214, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923).
29. Ibid.
30. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 1952).
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the purview of the bill. Only if the later addition of the phrase "railroad
employees" indicated a newly formed desire to limit the scope of the ex-
clusionary clause to transportation workers, could ctjsdein gencris justifiably
be invoked.31 But if that had been the motive for changing the amendment
into its final form, the drafters could have made their purpose much clearer
by a far less subtle use of words. Ejusdcm gcncris thus misrepresents legis-
lative intent.
The Tenney court speculated that Congress intended to limit the employ-
ment contract exception to transportation workers in order to exclude only
those classes of employees for whom statutorily created arbitration procedures
already existed. That reasoning is unpersuasive. Such procedures were
available only to seamen and railroad workers,32 the two classes specifically
named. Had the legislative purpose been that hypothesized by the court,
Congress would not also have excluded "any other class of employees," 33
,'workers for whom no such procedure was provided. Furthermore, the
separate arbitration procedure previously established for railroad employees
was inapplicable to employment contracts.34 Hence it was not comparable
to the enforcement machinery which the court held to be provided by the
Arbitration Act for the employees of non-transportation industries. The
inadequacy in the Third Circuit's rationale, plus the contrary legislative
history, 35 indicate that the court misapplied the cjtisdcm gcncris rule.
Going further, Tenney reaffirmed a view 30 on which the Third Circuit's
own Greyound decisions 37 had cast some doubt. The doubt arose in the
following fashion. Section 1 of the Arbitration Act defines commerce. Origi-
nally the Third Circuit considered the clause excluding "contracts of employ-
ment" as a subtraction from the scope of "commerce" and thus part of this
definition.38 It was also the court's position that Section 3 could be used
to enforce an arbitration agreement even though the contract did not involve
commerce as defined in Section 1. Therefore, the fact that a labor arbitration
31. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
32. REV. STAT. § 4554 (1875) (seamen) ; 38 STAT. 103-103 (1913) (railroad vworkers);
see also 41 STAT. 469 (1920). See note 4, supra.
33. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1952).
34. The relevant provision of 38 STAT. 103-10 (1913) referred only to agreements
to arbitrate existing disputes. The arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement
normally provides for the arbitration of future disputes.
"Adjustment Boards" and a "Railroad Labor Board" existed for the settlement of
labor disputes. 41 STAT. 469 (1920). But their operation was neither dependent on, nor
directed toward, the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
35. See text at notes 28-31 supra.
36. Watldns v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1945); Donahue v. Susque-
hanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943). See also Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v.
United States, 142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944).
37. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Ass'n, 193 F.2d 327 (3d Cir.
1952); Amalgamated Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir.
1951).
38. Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1945) ; Donahue v. Susque-
hanna Collieries Co., 138 F2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943).
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agreement was a "contract of employment"--and thus expressly excluded
from the Section 1 definition of commerce-was held to be no bar to enforce-
ment under Section 3.39 But in the Greyhound cases, the Third Circuit in
effect reversed its prior position by holding that a "contract of employment"
could not be enforced under any section of the Act (including Section 3).
But the court did not expressly repudiate its previous holdings that the ex-
clusionary clause of Section 1 is part of the definition of commerce. 41 Hence,
the Greyhound decisions might have been thought to imply that the Third
Circuit would deny Section 3 enforcement to any contract not within the
definition of commerce. Tenney precludes such an inference by holding that
Section 3 makes a stay of proceedings available to a litigant in federal court
even when the contract in dispute involves neither a maritime transaction
nor interstate commerce. 42
However, Tenney's interpretation of Section 3 frustrates the Congressional
intent, expressed in the "contract of employment" clause of Section 1, to
exclude all employment contracts from the purview of the Act.48 By its
terms, the exception refers only to the contracts of workers "engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce. ' 44 If Tenney were correct in holding that
contracts which do not involve such commerce can be enforced under Section
3, then employment contracts of workers engaged solely in intrastate com-
merce would be enforceable if sued on in federal court. But creating such an
illogical distinction between the contracts of interstate and intrastate employees
imputes to Congress an unreasonable purpose 45 and contradicts both implicit
39. See cases cited note 38 supra.
40. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Ass'n, 193 F.2d 327 (3d Cir.
1952) ; Amalgamated Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir.
1951).
The rationale was that Congress had amended the statute by enacting the compilers'
catch-line when it enacted Title 9 of the United States Code into positive law. The
catch-line reads "exceptions to title." This was thought to be a manifestation of a con-
gressional intent to overrule the Third Circuit's view that the exclusionary clause was
only an exception from section 1 of the Act, the definition of commerce. See Sturges &
Murphy, Arbitration under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAw & CoNTMi.M'.
PROB. 580, 616 n.80 (1952).
41 Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Ass'n; Amalgamated Ass'n v.
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, supra note 40.
Section 1 reads: ". . . 'commerce', as herein defined, means commerce among the
several states or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the
District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such
Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any
State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to con-
tracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § I (Supp. 1952).
42. Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical R. & M. Wkrs., 207 F.2d 450 (3d
Cir. 1953).
43. See text at notes 28-31 supra.
44. See note 41 supra.
45. In 1925, when the United States Arbitration Act was passed, the concept of "in-
terstate commerce" was narrower than it is today. A greater proportion of the working
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and explicit legislative intent.46 Courts should respect this intent by holding
that the Act can be invoked only to enforce a contract which involves either
interstate commerce or a maritime transaction. 7
Adopting this interpretation in order to effectuate Congressional intent to
exclude employment contracts need entail only a negligible reduction in the
number of commercial arbitration contracts enforceable in federal courts.
Section 2 should be interpreted as creating a substantive federal right derived
from Congress's plenary power over interstate commerce.4 8 Since in enacting
the statute Congress attempted to provide enforcement for as many commer-
cial arbitration contracts as possible, it sought to use the full extent of its
force would have been considered as engaged in intrastate commerce. To have excluded
only workers in interstate commerce would therefore have been even more illogical in
1925 than it would be now.
46. One problem of consistency remains unresolved. Section 1 defines commerce to
include foreign, interstate, and territorial commerce; but the employment contract ex-
ception excludes only employment contracts in foreign and interstate commerce. Does
this mean that the Act makes arbitration agreements of workers in territorial commerce
enforceable? Perhaps "interstate or foreign commerce" should be interpreted as a short-
hand expression meaning all the commerce which Congress may constitutionally regulate.
The employment contract exception was clearly framed on the assumption that the Act
applied only to commerce within the regulatory power of Congress. Hearings before
Stbcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S.4214, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9
(1923).
47. Another facet of the Act's legislative history also tends to prove that it was in-
tended to apply only to contracts involving maritime transactions or foreign or interstate
commerce. The House version of the bill made its provisions applicable to contracts
involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction of admiralty, or which may be
the s=bject of litigation in federal courts (emphasis added.) H.R. REP'. No. 96, 63th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924) ; 65 CONG. REc. 11081 (1925). But the Act finally passed was
made to conform to the Senate version by deletion of this third category, contracts the
subject of litigation in federal courts. 66 CoNG. REc. 2759-62, 30034. The purpose of the
Senate Bill was to make only the first two categories enforceable. Sux. Rr.E. No. 536,
6Sth Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924). The subsequent difficulties which the courts have ex-
perienced in construing the Act have no doubt been caused by an imperfect reconciliation
of the two versions.
Sturges & Murphy reach the same conclusion on other grounds. See Some Confusing
Matters Relating to Arbitration under the US. Arbitration Act, 17 LAw & Coz.m.wp.
PaRaB. 580, 598-604 (1952). See also Kochery, The Enforcement of Arbitration in the
Federal Courts: Erie v. Tompkins, 39 Comr L.Q. 74 (1953).
48. See Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854, 86 (4th Cir.
1944) ; Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co.. 138 F.2d 3, 5 (3d Cir. 1943); Jackson v.
Kentucky River Mills, 65 F. Supp. 601, 603 (ED. Ky. 1946); I-.LR. REP. No. 96, 6Sth
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924) ; SEN. RaE. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924). Cf. Texas
Development Co. v. McGough Bros., 165 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1947).
Several cases have termed arbitration under the Act procedural or remedial. See
Murray Oil Products Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 146 F.2d 381, 383 (2d Cir. 1944); Parry v.
Bache, 125 F2d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Boston & Maine Transp. Co. v. Amalgamated
Ass'n, 106 F. Supp. 334, 336 (D. Mass. 1952) ; Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal
Co., 77 F. Supp. 364, 379 (D. Neb. 1948). But the contention made in the text is only
that contracts which evidence transactions involving commerce are made enforceable
1954]
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commerce power.49 As the scope of that power has been enlarged by judicial
decision, the reach of the Arbitration Act has grown commensurately. 0 Under
presently accepted conceptions of the commerce power, there will be few
commercial arbitration contracts which must be held unenforceable because
they do not "involve commerce." 51
Finally, treating Section 2 as having created a substantive federal right
may make arbitration contracts involving interstate commerce enforceable in
state courts. The Arbitration Act has been held not to confer federal juris-
diction in itself.5 2 And explicit enforcement provisions of the Act are by
their terms available only to litigants in federal court.53 But the statement
in Section 2 that arbitration contracts covered shall be "valid, irrevocable,
under the congressional power over interstate commerce rather than under the power to
regulate the procedures in the federal courts. But see Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis
Bossert & Sons, 62 F.2d 1004, 1006 (2d Cir. 1933) (implies that the Act does not depend
on the commerce power).
49. See Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical R. & M. Wkrs., 207 F.2d 450,
454. See also H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1924): "[The enforcement of
arbitration] reaches not only the actual interstate shipment of goods but also contracts
relating to interstate commerce.!
50. A suit for breach of contract is not a cause of action arising under the laws of
the United States even if the defense is provided by federal statute (e.g., an agreement
to arbitrate). Gully v. First Nat. Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936). Therefore two conditions
must be met for the United States Arbitration Act to be available for the enforcement of
an arbitration agreement in a federal court. The contract in dispute must evidence a
transaction involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction of admiralty (at least
if any section except 3 is to be invoked, see pages 733-4 supra) and the controversy must
be one over which the federal courts would have jurisdiction in the absence of an arbitra-
tion clause. See Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, 62 F.2d 1004, 1006
(2d Cir. 1933), 3 MooRE, FEDmAL PRAcrncE 3426 n.12 (Ist ed. 1938). If the second re-
quirement were an indication that the Act was to operate on the basis of Congress's con-
stitutional power over the federal courts, the first requirement, that the contract in dis-
pute also involve commerce, would be a mere limitation on the scope of the Act, without
any jurisdiction-conferring purpose. As a linlitation, "interstate commerce" would have
to be interpreted as it was meant by the enacting Congress. The term as used in the
Act would therefore comprehend only such transactions as were understood to involve
interstate commerce at the time of its enactment. Many contracts which today would
be held to involve such commerce would be excluded from the purview of the Act. On
the other hand, if the requirement that the controversy be justiciable in the federal courts
aside from the arbitration clause is the limitation, "interstate commerce" is the consti-
tutional basis of the Act. Then, since Congress sought to use its power over such com-
merce to its fullest extent, the reach of the Act must extend to whatever limits the con-
cept is held to have at any given time.
51. See Wilko v. Swan, 74 S. Ct. 182, 183 (1953) ; 62 Yale L.J. 985 (1953). Plain-
tiff had been induced to enter into a margin agreement for the purchase of stock as a
result of solicitations sent through the channels of interstate commerce. The margin
agreement was therefore a "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce" with-
in the meaning of the Arbitration Act.
52. San Carlo Opera Co. v. Conley, 72 F. Supp. 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd per
curiam, 163 F2d 310 (2d Cir. 1947).
53. See especially sections 3 and 4, 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (Supp. 1952), which refer to
"court[s] of the United States."
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and enforceable" contrasts with common law treatment of arbitration agree-
ments.54 That provision is sufficient to indicate that the Act makes contracts
involving commerce subject to state remedies in the nature of specific per-
formance, the precise form of which can be determined by consulting state
decisional and statutory law.m Such an interpretation would greatly enlarge
the number of arbitration agreements made enforceable by the Act.
Tenney contorts the Arbitration Act in an unjustified effort to render labor
arbitration contracts enforceable. If the public policy enunciated by Congress
in passing the Act has changed so that it now favors enforcement of such
agreements, the remedy lies in legislative amendment, not judicial manipula-
tion.50  Cases may often arise which are not specifically covered by general
legislation. Then the courts must interpret the applicable legislation broadly
to effectuate the over-all policy which Congress has chosen. But this neces-
sity is not a license to fly in the face of an explicit statutory prohibition whose
limits are defined by its context and legislative history. Certainly the imple-
mentation of public policy does not require the strained and inconsistent inter-
pretation which the Third Circuit has given the Arbitration Act.
54. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 1952); SEN. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924).
55. A federal statute enacted under a delegated power is enforceable in state court
even where the statute relates to the "remedy" (penalty), rather than to the "right,"
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1946), and despite any state policy contrary to the policy
and purpose of the federal act, U.S. CoNsr. Art. VI, §2, Mondou v. New York, N.H.
& H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 55-9 (1912). A state court has jurisdiction to enforce a federal
right unless exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts is required by the Constitution or
by intent of Congress, expressly or necessarily implied. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. S33
(1876).
No congressional intent to exclude state enforcement of the Arbitration Act is ex-
pressed therein and it is not clear that such an intent is necessarily implied. The Report
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. RrEI. No. 96, 6Sth Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1924), speaks of the Act as being procedural and enforceable by the courts of the
United States. But this intent to pitch the statute on a procedural level was presumably
abandoned when the Act was amended to make it applicable only to contracts involving
commerce. An intent to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts can be inferred,
if at all, solely from the fact that the procedural sections of the Act refer only to courts
of the United States. But note that the Bankruptcy Act,*14 STAT. 517 et seq. (1867),
under which suit was brought in Claflin v. Houseman, sapra, seems to imply exclusive
federal jurisdiction at least as strongly as the Arbitration Act. See also The Maccabees
v. City of North Chicago, 125 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1942) (state substantive right can be
enforced in federal court despite the fact that the sole remedies provided by the same
statute are available only in state court). Bunn, National Law of Unfair Compotlior,, 62
H.Av. L. REv. 987 (1924), suggests an interpretation of the Federal Trade Commission
Act which is analogous to the interpretation of the Arbitration Act contended for here.
He argues that the practices declared illea l by the FTCA are broader than the remedies
provided; therefore unfair trade practices affecting commerce should be actionable by
private parties in federal court or in state courts under federal law.
The only reported attempt to invoke the United States Arbitration Act in state court
failed, however. Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co.. 153 Neb. 160, 43 N.W.2d
657 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 812 (1951).
56. But see Cox, Grieva7wce Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 Hnv. L Rm,. 591
(1954).
19541
